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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
vention alone when an individual prisoner asserts one of the many legal
remedies that are available to him will satisfactorily solve the problem.
DONALD W. STEPHENS
Dealing with Unruly Persons in the Courtroom
Courtroom disruptions are nothing new.1 Throughout the course of
English and American judicial history, both defendants and prosecutors
have found it necessary from time to time to balk at established procedures
or even to use the courtroom as a stage from which to publicize social
or political positions through their histrionics. From the Stuart Star
Chamber to the trial of Peter Zenger,2 from the Massachusetts trial of
accused "anarchists" Sacco and Vanzetti' to trials such as Dennis v. United
States4 in the McCarthy era of the late 1940's and early 1950's and,
finally, to the Black Panther and leftist "conspiracy" trials of today,5
litigating parties have come to court as interested in publicizing their
causes as in seeking justice.6 Indeed, some have come expecting injustice
and, thus, have been further influenced to disrupt their trials to point out
unfairness. Treasured publicity inheres in courtroom disruption precisely
because of the shock value of actions that flaunt the procedures and
authority of the judiciary and the sensitivities of most citizens, who
traditionally regard the courts as chambers of practiced decorum presided
over by figureheads of wisdom and justice.
Disruptive actions surprise no students of judicial or political history;
by the Prison Department only if we can secure sufficient support from the
general public to obtain resources required for the task.
Bounds, The Seriousness of Our Prison Problems: Why the Next Two Articles
are Important to You, 32 POPULAR GOVERNMENT 1 (Apr. 1966).
'Thomas of Chartham v. Benet of Stamford, 24 Seld. Soc. (Eyre of Kent, 6 &
7 Edw. I, 1313-14, vol. 1); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821);
Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888); State v. Woodfin, 27 N.C. 199 (1844).
'See RUTHERFORD, JOHN PETER ZENGER (reprint 1941). The trial of Zenger
in 1735 is one of the earliest known in the New World in which the issue was
freedom of the press.
'F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1927).
'339 U.S. 162 (1950).
'See TIME, March 2, 1970, vol. 95, at 8-11; TIME, March 9, 1970, vol. 95, at
31.
, See generally D. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH
(1969).
'P. & D. BAcocK & B. ABEL, THE CONSPIRACY 70 (1969).
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but they do raise considerable concern among proponents of the judiciary
who want the process of trial to be molded so that it can deal with such
occurrences and still render justice. This comment will deal with methods
courts have adopted to meet disruptive courtroom conduct. The responses
of the courts fall easily into four categories: securing and muffling the
disruptive defendant; posting armed guards in and around the court-
room; excluding the disruptive defendant or spectator from the courtroom;
and adjudicating the disruptive defendant, spectator, or attorney to be
in criminal contempt of court.
VARIOUS METHODS OF RESTRAINT IN THE COURTROOM
While freedom from handcuffs, shackles, manacles, or gags is a very
important part of a fair and impartial trial," the use of such restraining
devices is clearly within the discretion of the trial judge.' Both shackling
defendants in the presence of a jury and having the defendant seen by
the jury while he is in shackles are ordinarily thought to be of great
prejudice to a fair trial because either action introduces extraneous indicia
of guilt into the minds of presumably impartial jurors.'0 However, the
defendant's privilege to be free from confining devices during trial may
be lost as a result of his disruptive conduct" or of the belief of the pre-
siding judge that the defendant will disrupt the proceedings or attack the
court's officers.
When the defendant is shackled during transport to and from jail, but
is unshackled during trial, the burden of proof is upon him to establish
that he was prejudiced by having been seen by a juror before the shackles
were removed.13 A trial judge's admonition to the jurors to banish from
their minds having seen the defendant in handcuffs has been held to have
8 Way v. United States, 285 F.2d 253, 254 (10th Cir. 1960) ; Blaine v. United
States, 136 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
9 Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867
(1968); DeWolf v. Waters, 205 F.2d 234 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 837
(1953); Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 873
(1951); Hilton v. Peyton, 267 F. Supp. 719, (W.D. Va. 1967).
" See McCoy v. Wainwright, 396 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Gregory v. United
States, 365 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1967).
" Illinois v. Allen, 38 U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Mar. 31, 1970) (while binding may
be used, it inheres with prejudice and ought to be used sparingly).
- United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Ormento v.
United States, 375 U.S. 940 (1963), rehearing denied, Galante v. United States,
377 U.S. 913 (1964).
" Gregory v. United States, 365 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1029 (1967).
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cured whatever prejudice might have resulted from such a view.14 It has
been held not erroneous to permit the handcuffing of a defendant who was
represented by his attorney to be emotionally disturbed"8 even though the
defendant remained calm throughout the trial. Restraining a defendant
when there is a danger of his attempting to escape has also been sus-
tained.16 Failure to remove the handcuffs at the entry of a guilty plea
was held not to have been shown to be prejudicial to the defendant. 17
Finally, if his disturbance is vocal, the defendant may be gagged. 18 Thus,
when any danger of escape, disruptive clamor, or injury to person can be
shown, the defendant may be bound and, if necessary, gagged. 9
A less prejudicial method of restraint is illustrated by cases in which
courts have permitted placing armed guards around the courtroom20 or
around the courthouse.2' In a case in which there were twenty defendants
on trial at the same time, the trial court's action in placing extra marshals
around the courtroom and at the doors was held to have been reason-
able.22 And a trial judge's action in ordering more marshals to duty after
the defendants had climbed into the jury box and assaulted several jurors
and had thrown furniture at the District Attorney was sustained as a
reasonable exercise of discretion to maintain order in the courtroom.
2
3
Stationing an armed guard outside the courtoom after a defendant had
smuggled out a note containing an escape plot was sustained as a reason-
able measure for preventing his flight.2 4 In order to minimize possible
" Sawyer v. Rhay, 340 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 861
(1965).
" Harbold v. Myers, 367 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, Harbold v.
Rundle, 386 U.S. 920 (1967).
. "9Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 873
(1951); Blaine v. United States, 136 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
" Rigby v. Russell, 287 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
8 Illinois v. Allen, 38 U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. March 31, 1970).
" The Eichmann-type box used by the Israeli prosecutors of the former Nazi
has been suggested as one technique for controlling the defendant without the
need for shackles or gags. Denying the defendant the right to leave his cell during
the trial has also been propounded. TIME, March 9, 1970, vol. 95, at 33.."Dennis v. Dees, 278 F. Supp. 354 (D. La. 1968). See Leyvas v. United
States, 264 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1959); Burwell v. Teets, 245 F.2d 154 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 896, rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1957).
2 State v. Mansell, 192 N.C. 20, 133 S.E. 190 (1926).
'2 Leyvas v. United States, 264 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1958).
2 8United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, cert. denied, Ormento v. United
States, 375 U.S. 940, rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1963).
24 Burwell v. Teets, 245 F.2d 154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 896, rehear-
ing denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1957).
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prejudice to the defendant, courts still require that no more force than
is necessary be used to avoid disruptions of the trial or escape.
Little doubt exists that binding and even gagging a defendant when
reasonably necessary to prevent his escape or his disorderly disturbance
of the court are within the power of the trial judge. Likewise, there is
no doubt that a judge is permitted to have armed guards present in the
courtroom when a defendant is unruly. However, until very recently,2 5
the power to exclude the defendant from the courtroom to prevent him
from disturbing the court has rested on less certain grounds.
EXcLUSION OF THE DEFENDANT FROM THE COURTROOM
The right of the defendant to be present during his trial is recognized
in both federal26 and the North Carolina case law.27 The right to be
present as applied by the North Carolina court is not of constitutional
derivation,2 but it does buttress the constitutional rights of the defendant
to confront his accusers29 and to be convicted only in open court 0 In
the federal courts, the right to be present has been held to afford the
defendant an opportunity to offer matters in mitigation of punishment
once the verdict has been rendered.8' Insofar as the defendant's presence
supports his constitutional right to confront his accusers, the right to be
present is not unique to either the federal or the North Carolina law; for
Saint Paul wrote of the existence of such a privilege in the body of
Roman law: "[I]t is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man
to die, before that he which is accused have the accusers face to face, and
have license to answer for himself concerning the' crime laid against
him"'2 I i
The courts have repeatedly affirmed the existence of the right to be
" Pearson v. United States, 325 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Cross v. United
States, 325 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
2 Illinois v. Allen, 38 U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Mar. 31, 1970). In addition, see
FED. R. Cam. P. 43 (riquires presence of the defendant, but excepts voluntary
absence once trial begins).
",State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 166 S.E.2d 652 (1969); State v. Ferebee, 266
N.C. 606, 146 S.E.2d 666 (1966) ; State v. Kelly, 97 N.C. 404, 2 S.E. 185 (1887).
2" State v. Bazemore, 193 N.C. 336, 137 S.E. 172 (1927); State v. Kelley, 97
N.C. 404, 2 S.E. 185 (1887).
20 State v. Hartsfield, 188 N.C. 357, 360, 124 S.E. 629, 631 (1924).
00 State v. Bazemore, 193 N.C. 336, 137 S.E. 172 (1927)..
' Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961); Ball v. United States,' 140
U.S. 118 (1891); Walsh v. United States, 374 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1967).
" Acts 25:16.
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present at trial in cases involving the absence of defendants at various
stages of the proceedings. In Deschenes v. United States,3 the court held
that the defendant's presence is not required at stages involving the mere
discussion among attorneys and the judge of principles that the defendant
could not have understood had he been there.3 4 Numerous cases have been
remanded because the judge sent instructions to the jury without the
absent defendant's having had an opportunity to object to them.88 The
presence of the defendant has also been said to be essential when the
verdict is returned in capital cases 6 and when the sentence is imposed. T
Construing a Utah statute, the United States Supreme Court held the
defendant's presence to be necessary at the examination of jurors chal-
lenged for cause.
3 8
Despite the strong judicial support for requiring the defendant's pres-
ence at trial, the courts have nevertheless found that a defendant may waive
his right to be present.3 The courts are split as to the kinds of cases
wherein such a waiver may be made.4" One line of authority permits such
a waiver in all non-felony cases ;41 the other permits waivers in all non-
capital felony cases.42 One judge has attacked the latter rule on the basis
that the privilege and effect of mitigating punishment is peculiar to all
felony trials, not just to capital ones.4 However, capital cases do involve
the possibility of ultimately peculiar punishment, and so the distinction
88224 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1955).
8'But cf. Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1963).
8 E.g., Walker v. United States, 322 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 976 (1964). See Fina v. United States, 46 F.2d 643, 644 (10th Cir.
1931). See also, United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 867 (1945).
"' State v. Austin, 108 N.C. 780, 13 S.E. 219 (1891) (dictum).
" Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 129-31 (1891) ; Walsh v. United States,
374 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1967); Powers v. United States, 325 F.2d 666 (1st Cir.
1963).
88 Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
"Illinois v. Allen, 38 U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Mar. 31, 1970); United States v.
Davis, 25 F. Cas. 773 (No. 14,923) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1869); People v. DeSimone, 9
Ill. 2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
'Murray, Trial: A Comparative View, The Power to Expel a Criminal De-
fendant front His Own Trial, 36 U. COLo. L. REv. 171 (1964).
'• Davidson v. State, 108 Ark. 191, 158 S.W. 1103 (1913); Frank v. State,
142 Ga. 741, 83 S.E. 645 (1914); State v. McCrary, 365 Mo. 799, 287 S.W.2d
785 (1956).
42 Glouser v. United States, 296 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 825 (1962). State v. Ferebee, 266 N.C. 606, 146 S.E.2d 666 (1966).
" Prine v. Commonwealth, 18 Pa. 103 (1851).
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between capital and non-capital felony trials is entirely justifiable as being,
in the words of Judge Merrimon, "in favorem vitae."
44
Both the federal and the North Carolina courts have adopted the dis-
tinction.45 The rule in North Carolina is, "In all cases not capital the
defendant may waive his right to be present either expressly46 or by volun-
tarily withdrawing from the jurisdiction of the court,4 7 though his counsel
cannot waive it4 s for him."4 9 The federal cases indicate that waivers may
be effected in non-capital 0 cases if the defendant has fled after the jury
has been impanelled,5 1 has absented himself following a recess,52 or has
insisted that he did not want to "sit and listen through it all again."
5 3
The trial judge must carefully determine that the waiver is a volun-
tary and intentional one, however.5 4 Both the federal and the North
Carolina courts require that this waiver be made by the defendant and
not by his attorney.5 5 In Cross v. United States,"6 a federal case, no
intelligent waiver was evidenced by the record because there was no show-
ing that the trial judge had questioned the defendant concerning the
waiver.57 In North Carolina, the defendant may waive his right to be
present; "but the waiver should appear to the satisfaction of the Court,
either expressly, or by reasonable implication from what he says, or by
his conduct." 8 Several federal cases have involved the absence of the
"State v. Kelly, 97 N.C. 404, 406, 2 S.E. 185, 186 (1887). See also Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 78 (1957) (Clark, J. dissenting.)
" Glouser v. United States, 296 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 825 (1962); State v. Kelly, 97 N.C. 404, 2 S.E. 185 (1887). But cf. Hopt
v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
,o State v. Epps, 76 N.C. 55 (1877).
"State v. Kelly, 97 N.C. 404, 2 S.E. 185 (1887).
48 State v. Jenkins, 84 N.C. 813 (1881). See also State v. Hardee, 192 N.C.
533, 135 S.E. 345 (1926) ; State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624, 70 S.E. 294 (1911) (can
waive right to be present through counsel at misdemeanor prosecutions).
"' State v. Bazemore, 193 N.C. 336, 339, 137 S.E. 172, 173-74 (1927) (citations
omitted in text appear in notes 46-48).
5" Glouser v. United States, 296 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 825 (1962); United States v. Parker, 184 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1950).
" United States v. Ard, 359 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 863
(1966).
" Parker v. United States, 184 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1950).
" Pearson v. United States, 325 F.2d 625, 626-27 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
" Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584-86 (1884).
" United States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 1968) ; State v. Jenkins,
84 N.C. 812 (1881).
80325 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1963).8 7But see Parker v. United States, 184 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1950).
State v. Kelly, 97 N.C. 404, 407, 2 S.E. 185, 186 (1887). Cf. State v. Paylor,
89 N.C. 539 (1883) ; State v. Epps, 76 N.C. 55 (1877). See Price v. State, 36 Miss.
1970]
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defendant when the judge gave supplemental instructions to the jury."0
In State v. Hardee 0 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that if
the defendant's attorney declines to accompany the judge to the jury
room to hear the supplemental instructions, the defendant thereby waives
his right to be present. Curiously, the record in that case did not show
any examination of the defendant as to the waiver.
Given the defendant's right to be present, the power to exclude the
u2nruly defendant must be developed from the theory that he has, by
his conduct, waived that right."' An early decision, without even men-
tioning that the defendant was accused of a capital crime, held misconduct
to effect a waiver62 of his right to be present during the trial . However,
making only passing mention of the strict requisites of waiver, 4 the
United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Allen0 5 held early in 1970,
that "[A] defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after
he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues
his disruptive behavior, he ... [continues to misbehave so that] . . . his
trial, cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom." 6 Throughout the
opinion the Court carefully avoided denominating the extinction of the
unruly defendant's right a "waiver," and it cited as authority for the
peculiar ability of a defendant to "lose" a constitutional right the state-
ment b Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts that "[n] o doubt the
privilege may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct.""7
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which was reversed in
Allen, had held that misconduct could not constitute a waiver of a de-
fendant's right to be present in the courtroom.68 By contrast to earlier
531 (1958); Fight v. State, 7 Ohio 181 (1835). But see State v. Bazemore, 193
N.C. 336, 137-S.E. 172 (1927).
"E.g., United States ex rel. Auld v. Warden of N.J. State Penit., 187 F.2d 615
(5d Cir. 1951) (judge, with consent of defendant's attorney, wrote out answers
to questions from deliberating jury, held no violation of due process).
"192 N.C. 553, 135 S.E. 345 (1926).
81 Comment, Violent Misconduct in the Courtroom-Physical Restraint and
Eviction of the Criminal Defendant, 28 U. PiT' L. REv. 443, 452 (1967).
" United States v. Davis, 25 F. Cas. 773 (No. 14923) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1869) (no
mention of waiver of right to be present; court held that right to be present does
not include right to prevent trial by' disrupting it).
" Accord People v. De Simone, 9 Ill. 2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
" Delineated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
" 38 U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Mar. 31, 1970).
68 Id. at 4249.
'291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934).
' 8 United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1969).
[Vol. 48
UNRULY PERSONS IN THE COURTROOM
cases holding escapes to effect waivers, the holding of the Seventh Circuit
may seem curious, but it was designed to meet the rigid requirements of
Johnson v. Zerbst9 for finding a waiver of a personal right: the waiver
must be a completely unilateral decision of the defendant, and not one
compelled by an election of choices. A unilateral decision seems more
obviously present in the choice of a defendant to flee than in misconduct
whereby he might be attempting to defend himself from some threatened,,
unfair procedure.
Although excluding unruly defendants now has the sanction of the
Supreme Court, either the contempt procedure or the technique of binding
and gagging seems the better solution. When binding, used as judiciously
as possible to prevent prejudicing the jury, fails to quell the disturbance,
then the power of a judge to declare a mistrial and to sentence for
criminal contempt remains as a second step.7" These procedures seem
constitutionally preferable to excluding the defendant, for they are not
based upon the judicial conjuration of a waiver of rights when there is in
fact no such waiver. The protection that should be offered a defendant
who might protest procedural unfairness but for his possible exclusion
from the courtroom by an unfriendly or biased judge is another factor
that supports their use.71
EXCLUSION OF UNRULY SPECTATORS AND THE RIGHT
TO PUBLIC TRIAL
Unruly spectators present similar problems, but the trial judge is
restricted by a somewhat different consideration-the right to public
trial-in dealing with those persons. The right to public trial7l serves
to prevent the defendant from being subjected to Star-Chamber tech-
niques, and it also protects the publies interest in reviewing the efficiency
of its judicial officials. 3 The right is not absolute, however. It has been,
304 U.S. 458 (1938)."0See United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 235 n.1 (7th Cir.
1969).
' See Illinois v. Allen, 38 U.S.L.W. 4247, 4253 (U.S. Mar. 31, 1970) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
' State v. Yoes, 271 N.C. 616, 157 S.E.2d 386 (1967); State v. Pope, 257
N.C. 326, 126 S.E.2d 126 (1962).
8 U.S. v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 125 N.E.2d
896 (Ohio 1955) (right of press to report-public business held to override need
for excluding spectators in emotionally spectacular trial). But see People v. Jelke,
308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954) (press has no standing to challenge its ex-
clusion).
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overridden by considerations of public decency and morals74 and by the
necessity for maintaining order in the courtroom. 75
Since there is no requirement that certain spectators or members of
the public be present at trials, the most obvious remedy for an unruly
courtroom is to exclude boisterous persons.7" Indeed, it is widely recog-
nized that in order to maintain decorum,7 7 to prevent overcrowding,"'
or to prevent the emotional disturbance of a witness,7" the judge can
remove spectatorss0 without infringing upon the defendant's right to a
public trial. In addition, if evidence of a possible escape attempt merits
the precaution, stationing police at the door of the courtroom to maintain
order or even to search entering spectators has been upheld."1 Use of the
summary-contempt power, 2 suggested above and discussed below, is an
additional effective weapon against unruly spectators.
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
In early American casess the courts assumed that the summary power
to punish for direct or criminal contempt was of "immemorial usage" 84
and that it had been derived from the duty of the trial judge to maintain
the decorum of his court.8 5 The Judiciary Act of 1789" vested power
in the federal trial judge to punish unruly parties by fine or imprisonment
for any contempt committed before him. This power was re-examined by
"' People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
" Minnesota ex rel. Baker v. Utrecht, 221 Minn. 145, 21 N.W.2d 328, cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 810 (1946).
"' People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
7 United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949).
People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
, United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949).
8o Id.
"I Leyvas v. United States, 264 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1958); People v. Santo,
43 Cal. 2d 319, 273 P.2d 249 (1954), cert. denied, Graham v. California, 348 U.S.
959 (1955).
" See generally Fox, The Practice in Contempt of Court Cases, 38 L.Q. REv.
185 (1922).
" In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594-95 (1895) ; State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384, 400
(1855); In re Brown, 168 N.C. 417, 84 S.E. 690 (1915).
"'4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *283. Some scholars have suggested that
Blackstone was misled by an officially unreported case later published among Judge
Wilmot's writings. See THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 8-9 (1934) ;
Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts
in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L.
REv. 1010, 1042-47 & n.128 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter & Landis].
" Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COLUM. L.
REv. 525, 548 & n.95 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Nelles & King].
"'Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83.
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Congress after Judge James Peck had summarily imposed a fine upon
an unsuccessful litigant who had published an unbecoming tirade about
the judge after the trial was concluded."' The episode led to impeachment
proceedings in which William Wirt argued on behalf of the judge that
the great weight of the common law stood behind his client's exercise
of the summary power against a distant contemner and that if the exercise
of that power was to be disapproved, "it [was] in the power of Congress
to change it."'
Responding to the public outcry against the actions of Peck, Congress
in 1831 restricted the summary power so that a judge could use it only to
punish the misbehavior "of any person in the presence of the court or
so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."8 9 Eighty
years later, the Supreme Court, struck with what one commentator has
denominated "historical solecism,"9 decided in the case of Toledo News-
paper Co. v. United States91 that the proximity of action subject to the
1831 statute was causal rather than geographic. In Nye v. United States,92
decided in 1941, the Court found it necessary to overrule Toledo News-
paper; and, returning to the historical perspective of the legislation, it
held that geographic proximity to the court was a prerequisite to the
exercise of the summary contempt power. Rule 42(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure includes the power of a federal judge to
punish summarily any contempt that he sees or hears or that is com-
mitted in the actual presence of the court.9
The existence of a summary power that dispenses with the usual
requirements of due process-notice, opportunity to defend, jury trial,
etc.-has been justified on several grounds. Perhaps the earliest of these
grounds was that, without the power, courts would be contemptible." The
expedience95 of such a power was explained by one commentator to be
that the "danger of harshness on the part of a judge is less evil than
87 See STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JUDGE PECK (1833), cited in
Frankfurter & Landis 1024 n.68.8 Frankfurter & Landis 1025.
" Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487.
'0 Frankfurter & Landis 1030.
247 U.S. 402 (1918).
92313 U.S. 33 (1941).
9' FED. R. CRIm. P. 42(a). For a discussion of other federal statutes concerning
punishment for contempt, see Smith, Jury Trials in Contempt Cases, 20 GA. B.J.
297 (1958) ; Comment, Summary Proceedings in Direct Conternpt Cases, 15 VAND.
L. REv. 241, 248-50 (1961).
,Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 318, 329 (1788).
See NELLES & KING 548.
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the danger of complete suppression of the functions of justice by permitting
an uproar to continue unchecked." 96 Citing the deterrent effect of sum-
mary proceedings, another commentator has suggested that "the quick
committrnent of a contemner in a prior case would have a greater ...
effect than other methods on persons contemplating such conduct in later
cases."9 7 A judge in more ancient times wrote that the power was
necessary to keep the "blaze of glory shining round the court."9
Mention of the existence of an opposing school of thought on the
necessity of summary procedures cannot be omitted because its endeavors
have been responsible for important restrictions in recent years on the
exercise of the summary power to hold in contempt. Careful research
by recent legal historians99 has shown that before the fifteenth century
contempts committed before the court by strangers were punished, like
other trespasses, only after trial in the ordinary course. It was only with
the institution of the Star Chamber that summary proceedings began to
be used against contemners. 100 Any conduct that could in the least be
construed as rebellious against the Restoration Parliament or its courts
was prosecuted under this new, more arbitrary procedure. Thus, the
common law, which protected Judge Peck and which was cited by Black-
stone as the "immemorial usage,"' ' developed not from the bosom of
English jurisprudence, but rather from the repression and political turmoil
that tolerated a Star Chamber and gave birth to a revolution.'0 2 The great
liberal attorney of the nineteenth century, Edward Livingston, argued
eloquently against the use of summary procedures:
In the present improved state of the human intellect, people do not so
readily submit to the force of this word (necessity) as they formerly
did. They inquire-they investigate-and in more instances than one,
the result has been, that attributes heretofore deemed necessary for the
exercise of legal power, were found to be only engines of its abuse.
" Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARv. L. REV. 161, 172
(1908).
11 Comment, Summary Proceedings in Direct Contempt Cases, 15 VAND. L.
REv. 241, 257 (1961).
9 J. WILMOT, NOTES OF OPINIONS AND JUDGEMENTS (1802), quoted in Frank-
furter & Landis 1048 n.8.
"Fox, The King v. Almon, 24 L.Q. REv. 184 (1908); Fox, The Su mimary
Process to Punish Contempt, 25 L.Q. REv. 238, 242-44 (1909); Fox, The Writ of
Attachment, 40 L.Q. Rxv. 43, 57 (1924). See also, THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CON-
TEMPT OF COURT (1934); Frankfurter & Landis, 1042-49.
10 Frankfurter & Landis 1045-47.
1014 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *283-84.
102 Fox, The King v. Almon, 24 L.Q. REv. 266, 271-78 (1908).
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Not one of the oppressive prerogatives of which the crown has been
successively stripped, in England, but was in its day defended on
the plea of necessity.
03
To Livingston, the power of the judge to remove the offender from the
courtroom was sufficient protection.' In one of the few searching,
judicial examinations of the contempt power, Judge Cameron argued that
trial by jury should be retained in any event because, "It transcends
recognized frailties of human nature to suppose that a judge can be free
from the inclinations arising from natural pique which would be en-
gendered by a direct refusal to obey an order freshly made by him, and
the temptation to strike back which inevitably accompanies ruffled
pride."' 1 5
The possibility of such judicial abuse was recognized and feared by
many legislatures after the widely publicized Judge Peck scandal.0 0 As
a result, most of them attempted to limit the summary contempt power
by statute.10 7 Many of the state courts promptly threw out such legis-
lation, s08 usually on the ground that such laws were in effect an un-
justifiable and unconstitutional violation of the principle of separation of
powers. 0 9 One commentator suggests that, even today, only two cate-
gories of state legislation on contempt would be held valid if challenged-
statutes mainly affecting procedural matters and statutes fixing maximum
punishments." 0
In North Carolina, sections 5-1 to -9 of the General Statutes"'
describe the contempt powers of the courts. While North Carolina courts
103E. LIvINGSTON, COMPLETE WoRxs 264 (1873), quoted in NELLES & KING
419 n.102.
... Frankfurter & Landis at 1044 n.117. If the offender returned to the courtroom
and further disturbed it, he would be imprisoned to the end of the day's session and
charged with a misdemeanor. Finally, Livingston suggested making the offensive
conduct itself a crime triable by jury. In any event, the offense would be tried
by indictment and information rather than by summary procedure.
... Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657, 669 (5th Cir. 1956). And see,
Rhinehart v. Lance, 43 N.J.L. 311, 320 (Sup. Ct. 1881).
100 TEOMAs, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 49 (1934).
'107 Id.
..0 E.g., State v. Morrill, 16 ARx. 384 (1855). See also Ford v. State, 69
Ark. 550, 64 S.W. 879 (1901); In re Fite, 11 Ga. App. 665, 76 S.E. 397 (1912).
... Comment, Summary Proceedings in Direct Contempt Cases, 15 VAND. L.
R~v. 241, 251 (1961).
1
. THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 50-52 (1934). See also In re
Brown, 168 N.C. 417, 84 S.E. 690 (1915) ; In re Robinson, 117 N.C. 533, 23 S.E.
453 (1895); In re Oldham, 89 N.C. 23 (1883).
"1 1N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5-1 to -9 (1969).
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have recognized that a legislative interference to the extent of depriving
the judiciary of the means of self-preservation cannot be constitutionally
justified,"" these contempt statutes have been held regulatory and, thus,
not assailable as unconstitutional. 113 Section 5-5 provides for use of the
summary procedure against perpetrators of contempts committed in the
immediate view and presence of the court and requires only that the par-
ticulars of the offense be specified on the record and on any process of
execution founded on a judgment of contempt. The statute does not
contemplate a trial at which the accused is represented by counsel, 114 nor
does it include a right to jury trial on the issues of fact."" In addition, no
appeal lies from an order of direct contempt."' The order may be attacked
collaterally by petition for a writ of habeas corpus." 7 But even in the
habeas corpus proceeding, "It is not permitted that the testimony or rulings
[in the trial court] should be examined into, nor that matters fairly in
the discretion of the presiding judge should be reviewed, [n] or that judg-
ments erroneous in the ordinary acceptation of that term should be ques-
tioned."" s The review on habeas corpus extends only to the record to
determine whether the court below had jurisdiction and whether the
facts as recorded are sufficient to support the imposition of sentence. 11
While the summary nature of the power to punish for direct contempt
does give the judge a strong weapon with which to maintain a decorous
courtroom, it also puts into his hands a device that is easy to abuse and
hard to supervise. While North Carolina has refused to make inquiries
de novo into the circumstances surrounding contempt citations, the
federal courts, recognizing that miscarriages of justice have been and
still are perpetrated under the authority of the direct-contempt citation, 120
have shown an increasing willingness to re-examine the facts. Fisher v.
Pace'.' offers an example of such an inquiry. A Texas judge had en-
12 Ex parte McCown, 139 N.C. 95, 51 S.E. 957 (1905).
"IIn re Brown, 168 N.C. 417, 84 S.E. 690 (1915) ; It re Oldham, 89 N.C. 23
(1883).
.14lIn re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967).
... re Deaton, 105 N.C. 59, 11 S.E. 244 (1890).
11' Luther v. Luther, 234 N.C. 429, 67 S.E.2d 345 (1951).
""It re Palmer, 265 N.C. 485, 144 S.E.2d 413 (1965).
...In re Crcom, 175 N.C. 455, 457, 95 S.E. 903, 904 (1918).
...it re Palmer, 265 N.C. 485, 486, 144 S.E.2d 413, 415 (1965).
1.. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S.
131 (1965) ; Fleming v. United States, 279 F. 613 (9th Cir. 1922).
121 336 U.S. 155 (1949). Note the following excerpt:
"By the Court: I will declare a mistrial if you mess with me two minutes
and a half, and fine you besides.
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gaged in heated argument with an attorney and then summarily fined and
committed the lawyer for contempt. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented from
the reluctant affirmance by the Supreme Court on the ground that, "This
lawyer was the victim of pique and hotheadedness of a judicial officer who
is supposed to have a serenity that keeps him above the battle and the
crowd."'
122
Due to the recognition of the possibility for abuse of prerogative, the
history of summary contempt since Nye v. United States'm has been one
involving further limitation on the exercise of that power by the Supreme
Court. The challenge of the summary power has usually been based on
the due process clause and the sixth amendment. Levine v. United
States124 held that while criminal-contempt proceedings are not criminal
proceedings within the sixth amendment, regard must still be had for the
requirements of a fair proceeding. 
25
Subsequent decisions have lessened the possibility that human frail-
ties, which Livingston so feared, will influence the judge to hand down
excessive punishments following heated exchanges with litigants or
attorneys. In Cooke v. United States 21 the Supreme Court suggested
as early as 1925 that judges who have been personally attacked by con-
temners should disqualify themselves in favor of having the contempt
proceeding conducted by a neutral, impartial judge. Later, in Offutt v.
United States,12 the Court exercised its supervisory powers over the
administration of the lower federal courts to reverse a contempt conviction
on the ground that the sentencing judge "permitted himself to become
personally embroiled with the petitioner."'28 The Court added that,
"where the misconduct charged is entangled with the judge's personal
feeling against the lawyer,' 29 he should disqualify himself and ask the
chief district judge to sit in the second hearing on remand. However, it
seems clear from Cooke that attacks intended to provoke the judge into a
mistrial will not succeed if the judge maintains his composure.130
"By Mr. Fisher: That is all right. We take exception to the conduct
of the Court.
"By the Court: That is all right. I will fine you $25.00."... Id. at 166 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
123313 U.S. 33 (1941).
.". 362 U.S. 610 (1960).
.2 Id. at 616. See also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
23267 U.S. 517 (1925).
127348 U.S. 11 (1954).
128 Id. at 17.
'1Id. at 14.
"' See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
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. It has been pointed out that hostilities between the judge and the
contemner are especially likely when the trial is held under politically
disturbed circumstances, especially if the political philosophies of those
on trial are abhorrent to the judge.' Dissenting from the Court's affir-
mance of the summary conviction for contempt of one Sacher, a lawyer
in the communist-conspiracy case of Dennis v. United States,182 Mr.
Justice Black suggested:
Yet from the very parts of the record that Judge Medina specified,
it is difficult to escape the impression that his inferences against the
lawyers were colored, however unconsciously, by his natural abhorrence
for the unpatriotic and treasonable designs attributable to their Com-
munist leader clients. It appears to me that if there have ever been or
can ever be cases in which lawyers are entitled to a full hearing before
their liberty is forfeited and their professional hopes blighted, these are
such cases.' 3
While Cooke and Offutt seem to have incorporated the underlying tenets
of that suggestion, recent events imply either that this incorporation is
not widely known or that the tenets themselves are not universally
accepted.
The fight waged by Justices Douglas and Black against summary
commitment for contempt has usually centered around the deprivation of
jury trial effected by such procedure. 4 As Mr. justice Black wrote in
Green v. United States,135 the doctrine that a judge has "inherent" power
to make himself prosecutor, judge, and jury seriously encroaches upon
the constitutional right to trial by jury and should be repudiated. 8 ' The
principles supported by Mr. Justice Black and others 8 ' finally won
majority support in Cheff v. Schnackenburg' when the Supreme Court,
131 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 18 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
132339 U.S. 162 (1950).
133 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 19 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
... United States v. Bennett, 376 U.S. 681, 725-26 (1964) (Black, J., dissent-
ing); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 195 (1953) (Black, J., dissent-
ing); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 20 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting);
Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 163 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
'1356 U.S. 165 (1958).
18 Id. at 193. But cf. Illinois v. Allen, 38 U.S.L.W. 4247, 4249 (U.S., Mar. 31,
1970) (Black, J.).
13.See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 425 (1917)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); E. LIVINGSTON, COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVING-
STON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENcE 264 (1873); Fox, The Sumnmary Power to
Punish Contem.pt, 25 L.Q. REv. 238 (1909).
133384 U.S. 373 (1966).
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again exercising its supervisory power over the administration of the
lower federal court, ruled that sentences exceeding six months for criminal
contempt may not be imposed by federal courts unless a jury trial has
been received or waived.139 Justices Black and Douglas dissented and
expressed the view that irrespective of length of sentence imposed, one
charged with criminal contempt was entitled to a jury trial.14
Exercise of the contempt power to summarily punish a defendant whose
contemptuous conduct was less than violent or boisterous has also been
restricted. Ex parte Terry' made it clear that violent misconduct occur-
ring before the judge could be punished by commitment of the offender im-
mediately and without notice, testimony, or hearing. Yet the Supreme
Court in Terry cited Anderson v. Dunn,42 which in 1821 had established
the principle limiting the exercise of the summary contempt power to "the
least possible [use of] power adequate to the end proposed."'' 43 That
Terry was not to be relied on without reference to the limitations imposed
by Anderson was made clear in Cooke v. United States,'4  which involved
a defendant-attorney who had written a letter to the trial judge asking him
to disqualify himself. Reversing the contempt citation, the Court in
Cooke made clear that Terry reached only such conduct as constituted
"an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court and such a flagrant
defiance of the person and presence of the judge before the public" that
if "not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the courtis
authority will follow.' 1 45 The Court in In re Oliver, 46 reversing a con-
viction and summary commitment by a one-judge secret grand jury of a
defendant whose answers the judge thought evasive, re-emphasized,
The narrow exception to these due process requirements [advice to
defendant of charges against him, reasonable opportunity to make an
explanation or defense, right to counsel, right to question witnesses]
includes only charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of
18o Id. at 380.
'10 Id. at 384 (Black & Douglas, J.J., dissenting). Strangely enough, Cheff,
whose case established the principle, was not benefited by it; his sentence was for
only six months.
128 U.S. 289 (1888).
142 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). Although Anderson involved a contempt
of Congress, it has long been relied on as authority in cases involving contempt
of court.
1  'd. at 231.
1, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
1 Id. at 536.
148333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all of the essential
elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, are actually
observed 'by the court, and where immediate punishment is essential
to prevent "demoralization of the court's authority" before the public.147
Another example of the sort of conduct against which summary pro-
ceedings should not be used was illustrated in Harris v. Ullited States,148
in which the Court ruled that the summary power cannot be used against
defendants who refuse to answer questions on grounds of self-incrimination.
The necessity for use of summary procedures once the trial has
concluded has also come under heavy criticism. Sacher v. United States 40
held that the judge may wait until the end of trial to exericse the sum-
mary contempt power to punish persons for acts done during its course
if he feels that the exigencies of the proceedings are such that the use of
his power during trial would unduly prejudice a defendant or interfere
with the efficient administration of justice. The Court in Sacher re-
marked, "Reasons for permitting straightway exercise of summary power
are not reasons for compelling or encouraging its immediate exercise." 5
However, such a statement does not comport with the historical justifica-
tion for the summary power-the necessity to maintain a decorous
court.151
If the contemner is only warned during the trial"'2 and the judge does
not cite him for contempt until its end, the actual exercise of the summary
power bears no relation to the maintenance of an orderly court. justifica-
tion for exercise of the power has ceased when the misconduct subsides;
and with the disappearance of the justification, every reason for denying
the defendant a trial wherein he is guaranteed full procedural rights also
ceases to exist. Justice Black argued in Sacher: "[T]he trial was over
and the danger of obstructing it was passed. For the same reason there
was no longer need, so far as that trial was concerned, to try petitioners
for their courtroom conduct without benefit of their Bill of Rights pro-
cedural safeguards."'8 3 Justice Frankfurter suggested:
247 Id. at 275.
18 382 U.S. 162 (1965). See also Illinois v. Allen, 38 U.S.L.W. 4247, 4253
(U.S. Mar. 31, 1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
150 Id. at 9-10.
151 Illinois v. Allen, 38 U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Mar. 31, 1970).
" "As in the case of parental warnings to children, feckless repetition deprived
them of authority." Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 38 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
. Id. at 21 (Black, J., dissenting).
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[L]awyers who might be tempted to try similar tactics are amply
deterred, by the assurance that punishment will be certain and severe
regardless of the tribunal that imposes it. It is a disservice to the law
to sanction the imposition of punishment by a judge personally involved
and therefore not unreasonably to be deemed to be seeking retribution,
however unconsciously, at a time when a hearing before a judge un-
disturbed by any personal relation is equally convenient. 5 4
Finally, punishments imposed under contempt citations may be limited
by constitution or by statute. Constitutional prohibitions against the
imposition of excessive fines or cruel or unusual punishments have been
held to apply to punishments for contempt. 5 5 Some state decisions have
held that legislative restrictions permitting punishment at hard labor only
for certain crimes effect a prohibition against imprisonment at hard
labor for contempt. 5 6 While there is no statutory limit on the power of
the federal district judge to sentence for contempt, such sentences may
be reviewed in a manner similar to the review of the discretion exercised
by the trial judge.
5 7
CONCLUSION
The history, statutes, and cases in which contemptuous courtroom
conduct has been treated form the basis for a system affording efficient
protection for the administration of justice. Present cases and statutes
indicate that unruly defendants may be bound and gagged in order to
permit the trial to continue in their presence. Armed guards may be
used to maintain order. The defendant may be excluded from the court-
room when, by his disruptive behavior, he is deemed to have "lost" his
right to be present. Finally, the trial judge may summarily convict the
defendant of contempt. However, judges should exercise the strictest
caution in the application of these extraordinary powers.
Binding seems to be one effective but not totally satisfactory remedy
for dealing with the unruly defendant; however much his bonds may
prejudice the opinion of the jurors as to his guilt, the defendant is still
Id. at 37 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
1 5 Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959) (fine found not excessive);
Ex parte Keeler, 45 S.C. 537, 23 S.E. 865 (1895). However, this limitation is
diluted by the judicial technique of citing for separate acts of contempt.
E.g., Flannagan v. Jepson, 177 Iowa 393, 158 N.W. 641 (1916).
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 52 n.15 (1959) (suggesting that in a
review of the trial judge's discretion to determine length of sentence for contempt,
a relevant comparison might be made with punishments for statutory offenses in-
volving obstruction of justice).
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